Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters

Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause collateral e ects in terms of performance loss and increase i...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Prada, Iván, Igual, Francisco D., Olcoz Herrero, Katzalin
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2019
Materias:
Ciencias Informáticas
cache attacks
flush+reload
AES
performance monitoring counters
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/80337
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-80337
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Informáticas
cache attacks
flush+reload
AES
performance monitoring counters
spellingShingle Ciencias Informáticas
cache attacks
flush+reload
AES
performance monitoring counters
Prada, Iván
Igual, Francisco D.
Olcoz Herrero, Katzalin
Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
topic_facet Ciencias Informáticas
cache attacks
flush+reload
AES
performance monitoring counters
description Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause collateral e ects in terms of performance loss and increase in energy consumption. We propose to monitor the victim process using an independent monitoring (detector) process, that continuously measures selected Performance Monitoring Counters (PMC) to detect the presence of an attack. Ad-hoc counter- measures can be applied only when such a risky situation arises. In our case, the victim process is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption algorithm and the attack is performed by means of random encryption requests. We demonstrate that PMCs are a feasible tool to detect the attack and that sampling PMCs at high frequencies is worse than sampling at lower frequencies in terms of detection capabilities, particularly when the attack is fragmented in time to try to be hidden from detection.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Prada, Iván
Igual, Francisco D.
Olcoz Herrero, Katzalin
author_facet Prada, Iván
Igual, Francisco D.
Olcoz Herrero, Katzalin
author_sort Prada, Iván
title Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
title_short Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
title_full Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
title_fullStr Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
title_full_unstemmed Detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against AES using Performance Monitoring Counters
title_sort detecting time-fragmented cache attacks against aes using performance monitoring counters
publishDate 2019
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/80337
work_keys_str_mv AT pradaivan detectingtimefragmentedcacheattacksagainstaesusingperformancemonitoringcounters
AT igualfranciscod detectingtimefragmentedcacheattacksagainstaesusingperformancemonitoringcounters
AT olcozherrerokatzalin detectingtimefragmentedcacheattacksagainstaesusingperformancemonitoringcounters
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820486856900609

Ejemplares similares