Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population

This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical consumers. The results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax competition model with immobile population. In addition to the fiscal and pecuniary externalities present in the standar...

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Autor principal: Fernández, Gonzalo
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2002
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
impuesto
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/56809
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi050402.pdf
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SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-56809
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
impuesto
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
impuesto
Fernández, Gonzalo
Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
impuesto
description This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical consumers. The results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax competition model with immobile population. In addition to the fiscal and pecuniary externalities present in the standard model, a new effect shows up in the mobility model to affect provision of the public good. As with the pecuniary externality, this new effect depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital. Thus, in a symmetric set up, the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality disappear, yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good. While in the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results, the mobility model strengthens the effects of the pecuniary externality. The above results are obtained by comparing the form of the first-order conditions between the mobility and immobility cases. The remaining question is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods conform to the predicted tendencies. This question is answered with an example. The results of this exercise show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, the level of the public good is lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case. However, if the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital, the public good level is sometimes higher and sometimes lower in the mobility case, contrary to predictions.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Fernández, Gonzalo
author_facet Fernández, Gonzalo
author_sort Fernández, Gonzalo
title Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
title_short Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
title_full Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
title_fullStr Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
title_full_unstemmed Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
title_sort strategic tax competition with a mobile population
publishDate 2002
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/56809
http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi050402.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT fernandezgonzalo strategictaxcompetitionwithamobilepopulation
bdutipo_str Repositorios
_version_ 1764820477616848898

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