Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation

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This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both prov...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cont, Walter Alberto, Fernández Felices, Diego
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2016
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
local indirect taxation
multistage taxes
tax icidence
tax competition
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/173853
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-173853
record_format dspace
spelling I19-R120-10915-1738532024-11-29T20:37:03Z http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/173853 Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation Cont, Walter Alberto Fernández Felices, Diego 2016-11 2016 2024-11-29T15:19:21Z en Ciencias Económicas local indirect taxation multistage taxes tax icidence tax competition This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution. Este paper analiza impuestos en múltiples etapas recaudados por provincias en un país federal, utilizando un modelo novedoso de competencia en dos segmentos productor- minorista a la Bertrand con productos diferenciados, donde cada productor está ubicado en una provincia, y vende en todo el país a través de sus distribuidores. Este modelo genera la posibilidad de que las provincias recauden en las dos etapas de transacciones. En primer lugar, se obtienen resultados de incidencia, enfatizando la importancia del grado de diferenciación sobre la traslación. En segundo lugar, se resuelve el problema de maximization de recaudación en un contexto no cooperativo y se estudian las propiedades de las alícuotas de equilibrio: las provincias utilizan todas las alícuotas o una de ellas descarta sólo una alícuota. La solución no cooperativa domina (en términos de recaudación) a los casos de impuestos al productor o a las ventas minoristas. Por otro lado, esta solución se caracteriza por imposición excesiva, (respecto de un caso cooperativo). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Objeto de conferencia Objeto de conferencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) application/pdf
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
local indirect taxation
multistage taxes
tax icidence
tax competition
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
local indirect taxation
multistage taxes
tax icidence
tax competition
Cont, Walter Alberto
Fernández Felices, Diego
Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
local indirect taxation
multistage taxes
tax icidence
tax competition
description This paper analyzes multi-stage taxation by provinces in a federal country, using a novel two-good, two-province, successive-oligopoly heterogeneous-product Bertrand competition model, where each producer is located in a province and sells its product through exclusive retailers located in both provinces. The producer-retailer setup allows provincial governments to raise taxes on upstream and downstream transactions. First, we analyze tax incidence results and emphasize the importance of the degree of downstream competition on the tax shifting. Second, we solve a non-cooperative revenue maximization problem and study the properties of the equilibrium taxes. We characterize the solution: either all tax rates are positive or one province drops one tax rate. This way, the full-tax solution dominates upstream and downstream taxation. Also, the non-cooperative solution implies over-taxation when compared with the cooperative solution.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Cont, Walter Alberto
Fernández Felices, Diego
author_facet Cont, Walter Alberto
Fernández Felices, Diego
author_sort Cont, Walter Alberto
title Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
title_short Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
title_full Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
title_fullStr Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
title_full_unstemmed Multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: Tax incidence and Leviathan taxation
title_sort multi-stage taxation by subnational governments: tax incidence and leviathan taxation
publishDate 2016
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/173853
work_keys_str_mv AT contwalteralberto multistagetaxationbysubnationalgovernmentstaxincidenceandleviathantaxation
AT fernandezfelicesdiego multistagetaxationbysubnationalgovernmentstaxincidenceandleviathantaxation
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