Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information

In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. On...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Cont, Walter Alberto
Formato: Objeto de conferencia
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2004
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170188
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
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spelling I19-R120-10915-1701882024-09-13T20:08:42Z http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170188 Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information Cont, Walter Alberto 2004-11 2004 2024-09-13T18:07:05Z en Ciencias Económicas In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Objeto de conferencia Objeto de conferencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) application/pdf
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
Cont, Walter Alberto
Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
description In a principal-supervisor-agent relationship with collusion, I rank the principal’s preference over the quality of the supervisor’s information. In the presence of imperfect signal and output distortions, the principal does better with hard-butnon-forgeable information than with soft information. Only in the limit case of accurate signal (i.e., the supervisor may observe either the true type or nothing) the principal with soft information is as well off as with hard information even under output distortions (as in Baliga). Nevertheless, distortions are needed for the creation of collusion stakes through differential information rents when the supervisor’s signal is noisy. The conditions under which the supervisor with soft information is still valuable for the principal are, first, that the supervisor’s signal’s must exceed some lower treshold of noise and, second, that side transfers between the agent and the supervisor must be inefficient.
format Objeto de conferencia
Objeto de conferencia
author Cont, Walter Alberto
author_facet Cont, Walter Alberto
author_sort Cont, Walter Alberto
title Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_short Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_full Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_fullStr Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_full_unstemmed Monitoring with Collusion and the Value of Information
title_sort monitoring with collusion and the value of information
publishDate 2004
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/170188
work_keys_str_mv AT contwalteralberto monitoringwithcollusionandthevalueofinformation
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