Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control

This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a lea...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Porto, Alberto, Porto, Natalia
Formato: Articulo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2000
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123638
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
id I19-R120-10915-123638
record_format dspace
institution Universidad Nacional de La Plata
institution_str I-19
repository_str R-120
collection SEDICI (UNLP)
language Inglés
topic Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices
spellingShingle Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices
Porto, Alberto
Porto, Natalia
Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
topic_facet Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices
description This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance. The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option than fiscal centralization.
format Articulo
Articulo
author Porto, Alberto
Porto, Natalia
author_facet Porto, Alberto
Porto, Natalia
author_sort Porto, Alberto
title Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
title_short Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
title_full Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
title_fullStr Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
title_full_unstemmed Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
title_sort fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control
publishDate 2000
url http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123638
work_keys_str_mv AT portoalberto fiscaldecentralizationandvoterschoicesascontrol
AT portonatalia fiscaldecentralizationandvoterschoicesascontrol
bdutipo_str Repositorios
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