Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search

Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auction...

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Autores principales: Feuerstein, E., Heiber, P.A., Mydlarz, M.
Formato: CONF
Lenguaje:English
Materias:
Costs
Random processes
Allocation mechanisms
Auction mechanisms
Auction theories
Incentive compatibilities
Incentive compatible
New mechanisms
Pricing rules
Randomized algorithms
Strategic biddings
Commerce
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires
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spelling todo:paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein2023-10-03T16:42:50Z Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search Feuerstein, E. Heiber, P.A. Mydlarz, M. Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auctioned). Stochastic auctions present several advantages over deterministic ones, as they are less prone to strategic bidding, and increase the diversity of the winning bidders. Meek, Chickering and Wilson [10] presented a family of truthful stochastic auctions for multiple identical items. We present the first class of incentive compatible stochastic auctions for the sponsored search setting. This class subsumes as special cases the laddered auctions of [2] and the stochastic auctions with the condex pricing rule of [10], consolidating these two seemingly disconnected mechanisms in a single framework. Moreover, when the price per click depends deterministically on the bids the auctions in this class are unique. Accordingly, we give a precise characterization of all truthful auctions for sponsored search, in terms of the expected price that each bidder will pay per click. We also introduce randomized algorithms and pricing rules to derive, given an allocation mechanism for the single- or multiple-identical-slots scenarios, a new mechanism for the multislot framework with distinct slots. These extensions have direct practical applications. © 2008 IEEE. Fil:Heiber, P.A. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. Fil:Mydlarz, M. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. CONF English info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-134
collection Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
language English
orig_language_str_mv English
topic Costs
Random processes
Allocation mechanisms
Auction mechanisms
Auction theories
Incentive compatibilities
Incentive compatible
New mechanisms
Pricing rules
Randomized algorithms
Strategic biddings
Commerce
spellingShingle Costs
Random processes
Allocation mechanisms
Auction mechanisms
Auction theories
Incentive compatibilities
Incentive compatible
New mechanisms
Pricing rules
Randomized algorithms
Strategic biddings
Commerce
Feuerstein, E.
Heiber, P.A.
Mydlarz, M.
Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
topic_facet Costs
Random processes
Allocation mechanisms
Auction mechanisms
Auction theories
Incentive compatibilities
Incentive compatible
New mechanisms
Pricing rules
Randomized algorithms
Strategic biddings
Commerce
description Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auctioned). Stochastic auctions present several advantages over deterministic ones, as they are less prone to strategic bidding, and increase the diversity of the winning bidders. Meek, Chickering and Wilson [10] presented a family of truthful stochastic auctions for multiple identical items. We present the first class of incentive compatible stochastic auctions for the sponsored search setting. This class subsumes as special cases the laddered auctions of [2] and the stochastic auctions with the condex pricing rule of [10], consolidating these two seemingly disconnected mechanisms in a single framework. Moreover, when the price per click depends deterministically on the bids the auctions in this class are unique. Accordingly, we give a precise characterization of all truthful auctions for sponsored search, in terms of the expected price that each bidder will pay per click. We also introduce randomized algorithms and pricing rules to derive, given an allocation mechanism for the single- or multiple-identical-slots scenarios, a new mechanism for the multislot framework with distinct slots. These extensions have direct practical applications. © 2008 IEEE.
format CONF
author Feuerstein, E.
Heiber, P.A.
Mydlarz, M.
author_facet Feuerstein, E.
Heiber, P.A.
Mydlarz, M.
author_sort Feuerstein, E.
title Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_short Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_full Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_fullStr Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_full_unstemmed Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_sort truthful stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
work_keys_str_mv AT feuersteine truthfulstochasticanddeterministicauctionsforsponsoredsearch
AT heiberpa truthfulstochasticanddeterministicauctionsforsponsoredsearch
AT mydlarzm truthfulstochasticanddeterministicauctionsforsponsoredsearch
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