Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception

The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of actin...

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Autores principales:	Babino, A., Makse, H.A., DiTella, R., Sigman, M.
Formato:	JOUR
Materias:	Behavioral economics Cognitive neuroscience Cooperation Corruption Self-deception article behavioral economics cognitive neuroscience female human human experiment prisoner dilemma self evaluation thinking trust cooperation cultural anthropology deception professional misconduct theoretical model Cooperative Behavior Culture Deception Humans Models, Theoretical Prisoner Dilemma Professional Misconduct
Acceso en línea:	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino
Aporte de:	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

id	todo:paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino
record_format	dspace
spelling	todo:paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino2023-10-03T14:38:17Z Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception Babino, A. Makse, H.A. DiTella, R. Sigman, M. Behavioral economics Cognitive neuroscience Cooperation Corruption Self-deception article behavioral economics cognitive neuroscience female human human experiment prisoner dilemma self evaluation thinking trust cooperation cultural anthropology deception prisoner dilemma professional misconduct theoretical model Cooperative Behavior Culture Deception Humans Models, Theoretical Prisoner Dilemma Professional Misconduct The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust. © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. JOUR info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-134
collection	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic	Behavioral economics Cognitive neuroscience Cooperation Corruption Self-deception article behavioral economics cognitive neuroscience female human human experiment prisoner dilemma self evaluation thinking trust cooperation cultural anthropology deception prisoner dilemma professional misconduct theoretical model Cooperative Behavior Culture Deception Humans Models, Theoretical Prisoner Dilemma Professional Misconduct
spellingShingle	Behavioral economics Cognitive neuroscience Cooperation Corruption Self-deception article behavioral economics cognitive neuroscience female human human experiment prisoner dilemma self evaluation thinking trust cooperation cultural anthropology deception prisoner dilemma professional misconduct theoretical model Cooperative Behavior Culture Deception Humans Models, Theoretical Prisoner Dilemma Professional Misconduct Babino, A. Makse, H.A. DiTella, R. Sigman, M. Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
topic_facet	Behavioral economics Cognitive neuroscience Cooperation Corruption Self-deception article behavioral economics cognitive neuroscience female human human experiment prisoner dilemma self evaluation thinking trust cooperation cultural anthropology deception prisoner dilemma professional misconduct theoretical model Cooperative Behavior Culture Deception Humans Models, Theoretical Prisoner Dilemma Professional Misconduct
description	The coexistence of cooperation and selfish instincts is a remarkable characteristic of humans. Psychological research has unveiled the cognitive mechanisms behind self-deception. Two important findings are that a higher ambiguity about others’ social preferences leads to a higher likelihood of acting selfishly and that agents acting selfishly will increase their belief that others are also selfish. In this work, we posit a mathematical model of these mechanisms and explain their impact on the undermining of a global cooperative society. We simulate the behavior of agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma game in a random network of contacts. We endow each agent with these two self-deception mechanisms which bias her toward thinking that the other agent will defect. We study behavior when a fraction of agents with the “always defect” strategy is introduced in the network. Depending on the magnitude of the biases the players could start a cascade of defection or isolate the defectors. We find that there are thresholds above which the system approaches a state of complete distrust. © National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
format	JOUR
author	Babino, A. Makse, H.A. DiTella, R. Sigman, M.
author_facet	Babino, A. Makse, H.A. DiTella, R. Sigman, M.
author_sort	Babino, A.
title	Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_short	Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_full	Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_fullStr	Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_full_unstemmed	Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
title_sort	maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception
url	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00278424_v115_n35_p8728_Babino
work_keys_str_mv	AT babinoa maintainingtrustwhenagentscanengageinselfdeception AT makseha maintainingtrustwhenagentscanengageinselfdeception AT ditellar maintainingtrustwhenagentscanengageinselfdeception AT sigmanm maintainingtrustwhenagentscanengageinselfdeception
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Maintaining trust when agents can engage in self-deception

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