Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financi...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Cordella, T., Yeyati, E.L.
Formato: JOUR
Materias:
Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires
id todo:paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
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spelling todo:paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella2023-10-03T14:11:45Z Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition Cordella, T. Yeyati, E.L. Bank competition Deposit insurance Financial opening Information disclosure Risk banking competition (economics) financial services welfare impact We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JOUR info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5/ar http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-134
collection Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
spellingShingle Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
Cordella, T.
Yeyati, E.L.
Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
topic_facet Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
description We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
format JOUR
author Cordella, T.
Yeyati, E.L.
author_facet Cordella, T.
Yeyati, E.L.
author_sort Cordella, T.
title Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_short Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_full Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_fullStr Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_full_unstemmed Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_sort financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
url http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
work_keys_str_mv AT cordellat financialopeningdepositinsuranceandriskinamodelofbankingcompetition
AT yeyatiel financialopeningdepositinsuranceandriskinamodelofbankingcompetition
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