Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search

Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auction...

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Autores principales:	Heiber, Pablo Ariel, Mydlarz, Marcelo
Publicado:	2008
Materias:	Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce
Acceso en línea:	https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
Aporte de:	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

id	paper:paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
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spelling	paper:paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein2023-06-08T16:37:08Z Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auctioned). Stochastic auctions present several advantages over deterministic ones, as they are less prone to strategic bidding, and increase the diversity of the winning bidders. Meek, Chickering and Wilson [10] presented a family of truthful stochastic auctions for multiple identical items. We present the first class of incentive compatible stochastic auctions for the sponsored search setting. This class subsumes as special cases the laddered auctions of [2] and the stochastic auctions with the condex pricing rule of [10], consolidating these two seemingly disconnected mechanisms in a single framework. Moreover, when the price per click depends deterministically on the bids the auctions in this class are unique. Accordingly, we give a precise characterization of all truthful auctions for sponsored search, in terms of the expected price that each bidder will pay per click. We also introduce randomized algorithms and pricing rules to derive, given an allocation mechanism for the single- or multiple-identical-slots scenarios, a new mechanism for the multislot framework with distinct slots. These extensions have direct practical applications. © 2008 IEEE. Fil:Heiber, P.A. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. Fil:Mydlarz, M. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales; Argentina. 2008 https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
institution	Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str	I-28
repository_str	R-134
collection	Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic	Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce
spellingShingle	Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
topic_facet	Costs Random processes Allocation mechanisms Auction mechanisms Auction theories Incentive compatibilities Incentive compatible New mechanisms Pricing rules Randomized algorithms Strategic biddings Commerce
description	Incentive compatibility is a central concept in auction theory, and a desirable property of auction mechanisms. In a celebrated result, Aggarwal, Goel and Motwani [2] presented the first truthful deterministic auction for sponsored search (i.e., in a setting where multiple distinct slots are auctioned). Stochastic auctions present several advantages over deterministic ones, as they are less prone to strategic bidding, and increase the diversity of the winning bidders. Meek, Chickering and Wilson [10] presented a family of truthful stochastic auctions for multiple identical items. We present the first class of incentive compatible stochastic auctions for the sponsored search setting. This class subsumes as special cases the laddered auctions of [2] and the stochastic auctions with the condex pricing rule of [10], consolidating these two seemingly disconnected mechanisms in a single framework. Moreover, when the price per click depends deterministically on the bids the auctions in this class are unique. Accordingly, we give a precise characterization of all truthful auctions for sponsored search, in terms of the expected price that each bidder will pay per click. We also introduce randomized algorithms and pricing rules to derive, given an allocation mechanism for the single- or multiple-identical-slots scenarios, a new mechanism for the multislot framework with distinct slots. These extensions have direct practical applications. © 2008 IEEE.
author	Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo
author_facet	Heiber, Pablo Ariel Mydlarz, Marcelo
author_sort	Heiber, Pablo Ariel
title	Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_short	Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_full	Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_fullStr	Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_full_unstemmed	Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
title_sort	truthful stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search
publishDate	2008
url	https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_97807695_v_n_p39_Feuerstein
work_keys_str_mv	AT heiberpabloariel truthfulstochasticanddeterministicauctionsforsponsoredsearch AT mydlarzmarcelo truthfulstochasticanddeterministicauctionsforsponsoredsearch
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Truthful Stochastic and deterministic auctions for sponsored search

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