Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors

Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solut...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado: 2015
Materias:
Hardware security
Side channel attack
Bridge theories
Eavesdropping strategies
Legitimate users
Low-loss
Measurement device
Quantum cryptography
Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires
id paper:paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
record_format dspace
spelling paper:paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez2023-06-08T16:02:51Z Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors Hardware security Side channel attack Bridge theories Eavesdropping strategies Legitimate users Low-loss Measurement device Quantum cryptography Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies. © 2015 American Physical Society. 2015 https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-134
collection Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic Hardware security
Side channel attack
Bridge theories
Eavesdropping strategies
Legitimate users
Low-loss
Measurement device
Quantum cryptography
spellingShingle Hardware security
Side channel attack
Bridge theories
Eavesdropping strategies
Legitimate users
Low-loss
Measurement device
Quantum cryptography
Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
topic_facet Hardware security
Side channel attack
Bridge theories
Eavesdropping strategies
Legitimate users
Low-loss
Measurement device
Quantum cryptography
description Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and measurement-device-independent QKD. Here we present a third solution that might exceed the performance and practicality of the previous two in circumventing detector side-channel attacks, which arguably is the most hazardous part of QKD implementations. Our proposal has, however, one main requirement: the legitimate users of the system need to ensure that their labs do not leak any unwanted information to the outside. The security in the low-loss regime is guaranteed, while in the high-loss regime we already prove its robustness against some eavesdropping strategies. © 2015 American Physical Society.
title Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_short Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_fullStr Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_full_unstemmed Quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
title_sort quantum key distribution with untrusted detectors
publishDate 2015
url https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_10502947_v92_n2_p_Gonzalez
_version_ 1768543193567068160

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