Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financi...

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Publicado: 2002
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Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
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spelling paper:paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella2023-06-08T14:36:35Z Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition Bank competition Deposit insurance Financial opening Information disclosure Risk banking competition (economics) financial services welfare impact We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 2002 https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-134
collection Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA)
topic Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
spellingShingle Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
topic_facet Bank competition
Deposit insurance
Financial opening
Information disclosure
Risk
banking
competition (economics)
financial services
welfare impact
description We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. While opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
title Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_short Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_full Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_fullStr Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_full_unstemmed Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
title_sort financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition
publishDate 2002
url https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00142921_v46_n3_p471_Cordella
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