Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states

We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at...

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Autores principales: De Magalhães, Leandro, Ferrero, Lucas
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Southern Economic Association 2023
Materias:
Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
Acceso en línea:http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388
Aporte de:
RIUNNE - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE) de Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
id I48-R184-123456789-51388
record_format dspace
spelling I48-R184-123456789-513882023-05-03T23:08:21Z Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states De Magalhães, Leandro Ferrero, Lucas Estados Unidos Tasa impositiva Impuestos Economía exterior We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level. 2023-05-03T13:44:11Z 2023-05-03T13:44:11Z 2015 Artículo De Magalhães, Leandro y Ferrero, Lucas, 2015. Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states. Southern Economic Journal. Lubbock: Southern Economic Association, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22. E-ISSN 2325-8012. 0038-4038 http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388 eng openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ar/ application/pdf p. 1-22 application/pdf Southern Economic Association Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, no. 2, p. 1-22.
institution Universidad Nacional del Nordeste
institution_str I-48
repository_str R-184
collection RIUNNE - Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Nacional del Nordeste (UNNE)
language Inglés
topic Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
spellingShingle Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
De Magalhães, Leandro
Ferrero, Lucas
Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
topic_facet Estados Unidos
Tasa impositiva
Impuestos
Economía exterior
description We estimate a nonlinear and discontinuous relationship between the tax level and the degree of alignment between the legislature and the governor, measured as the number of seats in the legislature that belong to the governor s party. In the states with the line-item veto, the tax level jumps at the point where the government switches from divided to unified. With a regression discontinuity design, we show that this jump can be interpreted as a causal effect. We propose a simple model to account for this nonlinear relationship. The sequential nature of the budget bargaining game, that is, the legislature proposes and the governor cuts with the line-item veto, implies that the tax level is determined by the overlap between the supporters of the governor and the supporters of the legislative majority. Changes in the size of the overlap determine the tax level.
format Artículo
author De Magalhães, Leandro
Ferrero, Lucas
author_facet De Magalhães, Leandro
Ferrero, Lucas
author_sort De Magalhães, Leandro
title Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_short Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_full Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_fullStr Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_full_unstemmed Separation of powers and the tax level in the U.S. states
title_sort separation of powers and the tax level in the u.s. states
publisher Southern Economic Association
publishDate 2023
url http://repositorio.unne.edu.ar/handle/123456789/51388
work_keys_str_mv AT demagalhaesleandro separationofpowersandthetaxlevelintheusstates
AT ferrerolucas separationofpowersandthetaxlevelintheusstates
_version_ 1765659728331931648

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