Sobre la existencia de los mundos posibles
In the discussion about the ontological status of possible worlds, there are typically two different positions: modal realism and modal actualism. They disagree on the scope of the notion of ‘existence’. According to modal realism, the kingdom of existence includes possible and actual worlds, while...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/5462 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=5462_oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In the discussion about the ontological status of possible worlds, there are typically two different positions: modal realism and modal actualism. They disagree on the scope of the notion of ‘existence’. According to modal realism, the kingdom of existence includes possible and actual worlds, while according to actualism, only the actual world really exists. We examine in this work Di Leo’s (2016) proposal, according to which, there are different valuations between statements that include the notion of ‘actual existence’ and the statements that include the notion of ‘existence’ simpliciter. If it was true, it would represent a defense of Lewis’ (1986) modal realism, which has been questioned by Barrio (1999). |
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