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The main purpose of the essay is to criticize Hausman’s characterization of the economic notion of preference, which he referred to as “preference*”. My main objection is that it is misleading to define preference* according to only two elements: preference and belief. Instead, I will argue that eve...

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Autor principal: Berneman, Nicolás
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion Artículo revisado por pares
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS - UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES 2020
Acceso en línea:https://ojs.economicas.uba.ar/CIECE/article/view/1873
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=filoeco&d=1873_oai
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spelling I28-R145-1873_oai2025-02-11 Berneman, Nicolás 2020-11-02 The main purpose of the essay is to criticize Hausman’s characterization of the economic notion of preference, which he referred to as “preference*”. My main objection is that it is misleading to define preference* according to only two elements: preference and belief. Instead, I will argue that even if we were able to assume belief as given, choices would still not reveal preference. Therefore, although it might be true that both belief and preferences are necessary for choices, I will argue that they are not sufficient as conditions. First, I will argue that efficacy should also be included as another element of the set preferences*. Then I will propose that, even if including efficacy, it could be misguided to conclude that we have reached a complete definition of preference*. Finally, I will suggest that there could exist a misunderstanding around the notion of belief. application/pdf https://ojs.economicas.uba.ar/CIECE/article/view/1873 spa FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS - UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES https://ojs.economicas.uba.ar/CIECE/article/view/1873/2588 Philosophy of Economics; Vol. 5 (2016): Filosofía de la Economía, Vol 5 (2016); 8 Filosofía de la Economía; Vol. 5 (2016): Filosofía de la Economía, Vol 5 (2016); 8 2314-3606 2314-3592 Español A Critique of Hausman’s Interpretation of Revealed Preference Theory info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artículo revisado por pares https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=filoeco&d=1873_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Español
orig_language_str_mv spa
description The main purpose of the essay is to criticize Hausman’s characterization of the economic notion of preference, which he referred to as “preference*”. My main objection is that it is misleading to define preference* according to only two elements: preference and belief. Instead, I will argue that even if we were able to assume belief as given, choices would still not reveal preference. Therefore, although it might be true that both belief and preferences are necessary for choices, I will argue that they are not sufficient as conditions. First, I will argue that efficacy should also be included as another element of the set preferences*. Then I will propose that, even if including efficacy, it could be misguided to conclude that we have reached a complete definition of preference*. Finally, I will suggest that there could exist a misunderstanding around the notion of belief.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
Artículo revisado por pares
author Berneman, Nicolás
spellingShingle Berneman, Nicolás
Español
author_facet Berneman, Nicolás
author_sort Berneman, Nicolás
title Español
title_short Español
title_full Español
title_fullStr Español
title_full_unstemmed Español
title_sort español
publisher FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS - UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES
publishDate 2020
url https://ojs.economicas.uba.ar/CIECE/article/view/1873
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=filoeco&d=1873_oai
work_keys_str_mv AT bernemannicolas espanol
AT bernemannicolas acritiqueofhausmansinterpretationofrevealedpreferencetheory
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