Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity

With the present article, I aim to analyze and evaluate the application of what Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifies as qualified distinctions to the relation between a principle of individuation, or haecceity, and the specific nature that corresponds to it. In the Scotistic milieu, a qual...

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Autor principal: Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Portugués
Publicado: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires 2024
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Acceso en línea:https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14451
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14451_oai
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spelling I28-R145-14451_oai2025-11-17 Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor 2024-03-29 With the present article, I aim to analyze and evaluate the application of what Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifies as qualified distinctions to the relation between a principle of individuation, or haecceity, and the specific nature that corresponds to it. In the Scotistic milieu, a qualified distinction is traditionally characterized as any distinction requiring inseparability between its distinguenda, while an unqualified distinction is usually viewed as requiring the opposite: separability. My conclusion is that the only qualified distinction able to be applied to nature and haecceity is the one Scotus calls “adequate distinction”. The other two qualified distinctions available –formal and modal– are not up for the job because relevant aspects of the nature/haecceity relation do not conform to their definitions. Com o presente artigo busco analisar e avaliar a aplicação do que Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifica como distinções qualificadas à relação entre um princípio de individuação ou hecceidade e a natureza específica que lhe corresponde. No milieu escotista, uma distinção qualificada é tradicionalmente retratada como qualquer distinção que exija inseparabilidade entre seus distinguenda, ao passo que uma distinção inqualificada é usualmente vista como exigindo o oposto: separabilidade. A conclusão que defendo é que a única distinção qualificada passível de ser aplicada ao par natureza e hecceidade é a que Scotus denomina “distinção adequada”. As outras duas distinções qualificadas disponíveis –formal e modal– não o são porque suas definições não se harmonizam com aspectos relevantes da relação entre natureza e hecceidade. application/pdf https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14451 10.34096/petm.v45.n1.14451 por Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14451/13144 Patristica et Mediævalia; Vol. 45 Núm. 1 (2024); 139-152 2683-9636 Duns Scotus Indivituation Nature Haecceity Distinction Duns Scotus Individuação Natureza Hecceidade Distinção Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity Scotus acerca da distinção entre natureza e hecceidade info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14451_oai
institution Universidad de Buenos Aires
institution_str I-28
repository_str R-145
collection Repositorio Digital de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
language Portugués
orig_language_str_mv por
topic Duns Scotus
Indivituation
Nature
Haecceity
Distinction
Duns Scotus
Individuação
Natureza
Hecceidade
Distinção
spellingShingle Duns Scotus
Indivituation
Nature
Haecceity
Distinction
Duns Scotus
Individuação
Natureza
Hecceidade
Distinção
Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor
Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
topic_facet Duns Scotus
Indivituation
Nature
Haecceity
Distinction
Duns Scotus
Individuação
Natureza
Hecceidade
Distinção
description With the present article, I aim to analyze and evaluate the application of what Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifies as qualified distinctions to the relation between a principle of individuation, or haecceity, and the specific nature that corresponds to it. In the Scotistic milieu, a qualified distinction is traditionally characterized as any distinction requiring inseparability between its distinguenda, while an unqualified distinction is usually viewed as requiring the opposite: separability. My conclusion is that the only qualified distinction able to be applied to nature and haecceity is the one Scotus calls “adequate distinction”. The other two qualified distinctions available –formal and modal– are not up for the job because relevant aspects of the nature/haecceity relation do not conform to their definitions.
format Artículo
publishedVersion
author Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor
author_facet Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor
author_sort Ferreira de Romariz Bragança, Vitor
title Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
title_short Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
title_full Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
title_fullStr Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
title_full_unstemmed Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
title_sort scotus on the distinction between nature and haecceity
publisher Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
publishDate 2024
url https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14451
https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14451_oai
work_keys_str_mv AT ferreiraderomarizbragancavitor scotusonthedistinctionbetweennatureandhaecceity
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