An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity

Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax compliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this model both moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explain four pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditional model, namely i) high level...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Laura Sour
Formato: Artículo científico
Publicado: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. 2004
Materias:
Economía y Finanzas
tax compliance
evasion
social norms
honesty
moral values
social interaction
Acceso en línea:http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-010&d=32313103oai
Aporte de:
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) de Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
id I16-R122-32313103oai
record_format dspace
institution Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales
institution_str I-16
repository_str R-122
collection Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)
topic Economía y Finanzas
tax compliance
evasion
social norms
honesty
moral values
social interaction
spellingShingle Economía y Finanzas
tax compliance
evasion
social norms
honesty
moral values
social interaction
Laura Sour
An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
topic_facet Economía y Finanzas
tax compliance
evasion
social norms
honesty
moral values
social interaction
description Scholars in public finance traditionally have analyzed tax compliance using the Allighman-Sandmo model. I include in this model both moral and social payoffs for compliance. This approach can explain four pieces of evidence that have not been explained by the traditional model, namely i) high level of tax compliance; ii) honest responses when individuals pay their taxes, even in the presence of high incentives for tax evasion; iii) the level of evasion increases with the tax rate; and iv) individuals are more likely to evade when they realize that there is a large number of evaders in society.
format Artículo científico
Artículo científico
author Laura Sour
author_facet Laura Sour
author_sort Laura Sour
title An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
title_short An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
title_full An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
title_fullStr An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
title_full_unstemmed An Economic Model of Tax Compliance with Individual Morality and Group Conformity
title_sort economic model of tax compliance with individual morality and group conformity
publisher Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
publishDate 2004
url http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32313103
http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-010&d=32313103oai
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