Privatização e processo decisório
This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector'...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo científico |
| Publicado: |
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
2009
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817690005 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21817690005oai |
| Aporte de: |
| id |
I16-R122-21817690005oai |
|---|---|
| record_format |
dspace |
| institution |
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales |
| institution_str |
I-16 |
| repository_str |
R-122 |
| collection |
Red de Bibliotecas Virtuales de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) |
| topic |
Sociología Privatization neo-institutionalism decision-making process Executive |
| spellingShingle |
Sociología Privatization neo-institutionalism decision-making process Executive Alexandre Sampaio Ferraz Privatização e processo decisório |
| topic_facet |
Sociología Privatization neo-institutionalism decision-making process Executive |
| description |
This article examines the political determinants of privatization of the fixed telephony sector in four countries, based on a neo-institutionalist approach. These countries faced similar pressures by telephone companies in favor of privatization, suggesting an apparent convergence in the sector's reorganization. However, although all four adopted some degree of privatization, the process followed different paths and designs in each country. This variation can be explained by the different institutional contexts in which the reforms were carried out. Where there was concentration of power in the Executive, privatization was launched earlier and approved more quickly than in countries in which such concentration waslessintense. Meanwhile, the existence of multiple veto points and stakeholders with veto power did not impede the reform, but increased the cost of its unilateral adoption by the Executive, forcing the latter to negotiate and form a minimum consensus within the governing coalition. |
| format |
Artículo científico Artículo científico |
| author |
Alexandre Sampaio Ferraz |
| author_facet |
Alexandre Sampaio Ferraz |
| author_sort |
Alexandre Sampaio Ferraz |
| title |
Privatização e processo decisório |
| title_short |
Privatização e processo decisório |
| title_full |
Privatização e processo decisório |
| title_fullStr |
Privatização e processo decisório |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Privatização e processo decisório |
| title_sort |
privatização e processo decisório |
| publisher |
Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro |
| publishDate |
2009 |
| url |
http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=21817690005 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=br/br-022&d=21817690005oai |
| work_keys_str_mv |
AT alexandresampaioferraz privatizacaoeprocessodecisorio |
| bdutipo_str |
Repositorios |
| _version_ |
1764820421624987651 |