Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly

How can constituted powers bind constituent power? Under what conditions can a constituent assembly limited in its powers to restrict other actors expand the subnational constitutional sphere? This paper takes the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City as a case study to show the actors' logic of...

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Autores principales: López Lara, Álvaro F., Loza, Nicolás
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2022
Materias:
Asamblea Constituyente
Coaliciones
Juego anidado
Precompromiso
Coalitions
Constituent Assembly
Pre-commitment
Nested game
Acceso en línea:https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/63
Aporte de:
RELASP de Universidad Nacional de Rosario
id I15-R205-article-63
record_format ojs
spelling I15-R205-article-632022-07-06T18:30:10Z Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly Precompromiso y coaliciones en la Asamblea Constituyente de la Ciudad de México López Lara, Álvaro F. Loza, Nicolás Asamblea Constituyente Coaliciones Juego anidado Precompromiso Coalitions Constituent Assembly Pre-commitment Nested game How can constituted powers bind constituent power? Under what conditions can a constituent assembly limited in its powers to restrict other actors expand the subnational constitutional sphere? This paper takes the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City as a case study to show the actors' logic of pre-commitment, in the form of a nested game (Tsebelis, 1990; Schedler, 2003) in which the constituted powers at the national level accepted holding a subnational Constituent Assembly, designing the rules for convening and selecting the members of the assembly as well as limiting its decision-making autonomy, while the ruling party in Mexico City supported the initiative of constitutional reforms that were of interest to the federal government. In the constituent process, despite these ties, the actors expanded the subnational constitutional space by signing agreements and forming coalitions to pass a constitution that reflected a set of fundamental rights and provisions underpinning the political organization of the capital. ¿Cómo pueden atar los poderes constituidos al poder Constituyente? ¿En qué condiciones una asamblea constituyente que se halla limitada en sus poderes para restringir a otros actores puede ampliar el espacio constitucional subnacional? Este trabajo toma a la Asamblea Constituyente de la Ciudad de México como caso de estudio para mostrar la lógica de precompromiso de los actores, en la forma de un juego anidado (Tsebelis,1990; Schedler, 2003) en el cual los poderes constituidos a nivel nacional aceptaron la celebración de un Constituyente subnacional, diseñando las reglas para convocar y seleccionar a los miembros de la asamblea y para limitar su autonomía decisoria, en tanto que el partido gobernante en la Ciudad de México respaldó la iniciativa de reformas constitucionales que le interesaban al gobierno federal. En el proceso constituyente, a pesar de estas ataduras, los actores ampliaron el espacio constitucional subnacional, al celebrar acuerdos y formar coaliciones para aprobar una constitución en la que plasmaron un conjunto de derechos fundamentales y disposiciones que sustentan la organización política de la ciudad capital. Universidad Nacional de Rosario 2022-06-08 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/63 10.35305/rr.v2i4.63 Revista Euro latinoamericana de Análisis Social y Político (RELASP); Vol. 2 Núm. 4 (2022); 99-123 2683-7420 spa https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/63/121 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
institution Universidad Nacional de Rosario
institution_str I-15
repository_str R-205
container_title_str RELASP
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic Asamblea Constituyente
Coaliciones
Juego anidado
Precompromiso
Coalitions
Constituent Assembly
Pre-commitment
Nested game
spellingShingle Asamblea Constituyente
Coaliciones
Juego anidado
Precompromiso
Coalitions
Constituent Assembly
Pre-commitment
Nested game
López Lara, Álvaro F.
Loza, Nicolás
Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
topic_facet Asamblea Constituyente
Coaliciones
Juego anidado
Precompromiso
Coalitions
Constituent Assembly
Pre-commitment
Nested game
author López Lara, Álvaro F.
Loza, Nicolás
author_facet López Lara, Álvaro F.
Loza, Nicolás
author_sort López Lara, Álvaro F.
title Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
title_short Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
title_full Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
title_fullStr Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
title_full_unstemmed Pre-commitment and coalitions in the Mexico City Constituent Assembly
title_sort pre-commitment and coalitions in the mexico city constituent assembly
description How can constituted powers bind constituent power? Under what conditions can a constituent assembly limited in its powers to restrict other actors expand the subnational constitutional sphere? This paper takes the Constituent Assembly of Mexico City as a case study to show the actors' logic of pre-commitment, in the form of a nested game (Tsebelis, 1990; Schedler, 2003) in which the constituted powers at the national level accepted holding a subnational Constituent Assembly, designing the rules for convening and selecting the members of the assembly as well as limiting its decision-making autonomy, while the ruling party in Mexico City supported the initiative of constitutional reforms that were of interest to the federal government. In the constituent process, despite these ties, the actors expanded the subnational constitutional space by signing agreements and forming coalitions to pass a constitution that reflected a set of fundamental rights and provisions underpinning the political organization of the capital.
publisher Universidad Nacional de Rosario
publishDate 2022
url https://relasp.unr.edu.ar/index.php/revista/article/view/63
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first_indexed 2023-05-11T18:46:17Z
last_indexed 2023-05-11T18:46:17Z
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