Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it...
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234 |
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I10-R10-article-52342019-05-15T15:36:36Z Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers ¿Conocimiento fenoménico sin conceptos fenoménicos? sobre la teoría de los punteros mentales de Jesse Prinz Barberis, Sergio Daniel conocimiento fenoménico conciencia atención conceptos fenoménicos punteros mentales phenomenal knowledge consciousness attention phenomenal concepts mental pointers The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge. En este artículo, presento y critico la respuesta de Prinz (2007) al llamado “argumento del conocimiento” de Jackson (1982). La propuesta de Prinz descansa en dos tesis: en primer lugar, se basa en una original teoría neurocognitiva acerca de la conciencia; en segundo lugar, se apoya en una concepción del conocimiento de nuestras experiencias conscientes que no requiere, al parecer, la postulación de conceptos fenoménicos (versus Loar, Tye y Papineau, inter alia). Sostengo que la propuesta de Prinz es inadecuada tanto en aspectos empíricos, vinculados con la teoría de la conciencia que defiende, como en aspectos más conceptuales, relacionados con su teoría del conocimiento fenoménico. La conclusión de mi trabajo apunta, entonces, a cierta indispensabilidad explicativa de los conceptos fenoménicos para dar cuenta del conocimiento fenoménico. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba 2011-05-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234 Argentinean Journal of Behavioral Sciences; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Special Issue: "Intentionality and Conscience: Recent Approaches"; 64-74 Revista Argentina de Ciencias del Comportamiento; Vol 3, No 1 (2011): Número Especial: "Intencionalidad y Conciencia: Abordajes Recientes"; 64-74 1852-4206 10.32348/1852.4206.v3.n1 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234/5399 Derechos de autor 2011 Sergio Daniel Barberis |
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Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
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I-10 |
| repository_str |
R-10 |
| container_title_str |
Revistas de la UNC |
| language |
Español |
| format |
Artículo revista |
| topic |
conocimiento fenoménico conciencia atención conceptos fenoménicos punteros mentales phenomenal knowledge consciousness attention phenomenal concepts mental pointers |
| spellingShingle |
conocimiento fenoménico conciencia atención conceptos fenoménicos punteros mentales phenomenal knowledge consciousness attention phenomenal concepts mental pointers Barberis, Sergio Daniel Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| topic_facet |
conocimiento fenoménico conciencia atención conceptos fenoménicos punteros mentales phenomenal knowledge consciousness attention phenomenal concepts mental pointers |
| author |
Barberis, Sergio Daniel |
| author_facet |
Barberis, Sergio Daniel |
| author_sort |
Barberis, Sergio Daniel |
| title |
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| title_short |
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| title_full |
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| title_fullStr |
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on Jesse Prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| title_sort |
phenomenal knowledge without phenomenal concepts? on jesse prinz’ theory of mental pointers |
| description |
The aim of the present paper is to present and criticize the reply of Jesse Prinz (2007) to the “knowledge argument” proposed by Jackson (1982). Prinz’ proposal relies on two tenets: in the first place, it is supported by an original neurocognitive theory about consciousness; in the second place, it rests on a philosophical theory about phenomenal knowledge that seems to avoid the supposition of phenomenal concepts (versus Loar, Tye and Papineau, inter alia). I argue that Prinz’ proposal is inadequate both on empirical grounds – concerning his theory of consciousness – and on more conceptual grounds – concerning his conception of phenomenal knowledge. I conclude that the postulation of phenomenal concepts seems to be unavoidable in order to explain the nature of phenomenal knowledge. |
| publisher |
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba |
| publishDate |
2011 |
| url |
https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/racc/article/view/5234 |
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2022-08-20T00:49:13Z |
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