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20241030105347.0 |
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170307s2017 enka b 001 0 eng |
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|a 2017011186
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|a 9781107174078
|q (hardcover)
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|a 1107174074
|q (hardcover)
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|a 9781316626351
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|a 1316626350
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|a 9781316805619
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|a 1316805611
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|a (OCoLC)967198514
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|a (OCoLC)ocn967198514
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|a DLC
|c DLC
|d BTCTA
|d OCLCL
|d U@S
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|a pcc
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|a cl-----
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|a U@SA
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|a JL966
|b .H65 2017
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|a 361.6/5098
|2 23
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| 100 |
1 |
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|a Holland, Alisha.
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| 245 |
1 |
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|a Forbearance as redistribution :
|b the politics of informal welfare in Latin America /
|c Alisha C. Holland.
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3 |
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|a Informal welfare in Latin America
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| 260 |
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|a Cambridge, UK ;
|a New York :
|b Cambridge University Press,
|c 2017.
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| 300 |
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|a xii, 380 p. :
|b il. ;
|c 23 cm.
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| 490 |
1 |
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|a Cambridge studies in comparative politics
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|a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 342-367) e índice.
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|a Introduction -- 1. An electoral theory of forbearance -- 2. Who votes for forbearance -- 3. What enables forbearance: inadequate social policy and squatting -- 4. When politicians choose forbearance : core constituencies and street vending -- 5. Where forbearance occurs : the role of electoral institutions -- 6. Why forbearance continues : path dependencies in the informal welfare state -- 7. How forbearance ends : lessons from Turkey -- 8. Conclusion: Rethinking the politics of the poor -- Appendix A: Public opinion data on enforcement and social policy -- Appendix B: Coding rules for campaign platform, newspaper, and administrative sources -- Appendix C: Local government enforcement survey -- Appendix D: Information available in online supplement.
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|a "Why do governments tolerate the violation of their own laws and regulations? Conventional wisdom is that governments cannot enforce their laws. Forbearance as Redistribution challenges the standard interpretation by showing that politicians choose not to enforce laws to distribute resources and win elections. Alisha Holland demonstrates that this forbearance towards activities such as squatting and street vending is a powerful strategy for attracting the electoral support of poor voters. In many developing countries, state social programs are small or poorly targeted and thus do not offer politicians an effective means to mobilize the poor. In contrast, forbearance constitutes an informal welfare policy around which Holland argues much of urban politics turns. While forbearance offers social support to those failed by their governments, it also perpetuates the same exclusionary welfare policies from which it grows"--
|c Provided by publisher.
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| 650 |
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|a Politics, Practical
|z Latin America.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Public officers.
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| 650 |
|
0 |
|a Public welfare
|x Political aspects
|z Latin America.
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| 650 |
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0 |
|a Distributive justice
|x Political aspects
|z Latin America.
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Tácticas políticas
|z América Latina.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Funcionarios públicos.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Asistencia pública
|x Aspectos políticos
|z América Latina.
|2 UDESA
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| 650 |
|
7 |
|a Justicia distributiva
|x Aspectos políticos
|z América Latina.
|2 UDESA
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| 651 |
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0 |
|a Latin America
|x Social policy.
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| 651 |
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0 |
|a Latin America
|x Politics and government.
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| 651 |
|
7 |
|a América Latina
|x Política social.
|2 UDESA
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| 651 |
|
7 |
|a América Latina
|x Política y gobierno.
|2 UDESA
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| 830 |
|
0 |
|a Cambridge studies in comparative politics
|