The volatility curse : exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies /

""The volatility curse" examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Campello, Daniela, 1970-
Otros Autores: Zucco, Cesar, Jr
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2021.
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050 4 |a JL968  |b .C36 2021 
100 1 |a Campello, Daniela,  |d 1970- 
245 1 4 |a The volatility curse :  |b exogenous shocks and representation in resource-rich democracies /  |c Daniela Campello, Cesar Zucco. 
260 |a Cambridge, UK ;  |a New York :  |b Cambridge University Press,  |c 2021. 
300 |a xix, 239 p. :  |b il. ;  |c 23 cm. 
504 |a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 218-235) e índice. 
505 0 |a Introduction : representation in volatile economies -- Economic vote, exogenous shocks, and representation -- Can an economic vote promote representation? -- International conditions and economic performance in Latin America -- International conditions and presidential elections -- International conditions and popular support -- Understanding misattribution of responsibility -- Misattribution and incumbent behavior -- Pathways to better representation. 
520 |a ""The volatility curse" examines the conditions under which economic voting can (and cannot) function as a mechanism of democratic accountability, challenging existing theories that are largely based on experiences in developed democracies. Drawing on cross-national data from around the world and micro-level evidence from Latin America, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco make two broad, related arguments. First, they show that economic voting is pervasive around the world, but in economically volatile developing democracies that are dependent on commodity exports and inflows of foreign capital, economic outcomes are highly contingent on conditions beyond government control, which nonetheless determine relevant political outcomes like elections, popular support, and government transitions. Second, politicians are aware of these misattribution patterns and are often able to anticipate their electoral prospects well before elections. This reduces incumbents' incentives to maximize voter welfare, as anticipated by economic voting theories, and increases the likelihood of shirking, waste, and corruption." --Descripción del editor. 
650 0 |a Elections  |x Economic aspects  |z Latin America. 
650 0 |a Voting  |x Economic aspects  |z Latin America. 
650 0 |a Democracy  |x Economic aspects  |z Latin America. 
650 7 |a Elecciones  |x Aspectos económicos  |z América Latina.  |2 UDESA 
650 7 |a Voto  |x Aspectos económicos  |z América Latina.  |2 UDESA 
650 7 |a Democracia  |x Aspectos económicos  |z América Latina.  |2 UDESA 
651 0 |a Latin America  |x Economic conditions. 
651 0 |a Latin America  |x Politics and government. 
651 7 |a América Latina  |x Condiciones económicas.  |2 UDESA 
651 7 |a América Latina  |x Política y gobierno.  |2 UDESA 
700 1 |a Zucco, Cesar,  |c Jr.