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|a 332.11
|b C966 1992
|2 22
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|a Cukierman, Alex.
|9 69266
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| 245 |
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|a Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence :
|b theory and evidence /
|c Alex Cukierman.
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| 260 |
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|a Cambridge :
|b MIT,
|c c1992.
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| 300 |
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|a xx, 496 p. :
|b il. ;
|c 24 cm.
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| 500 |
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|a Publicada en diferentes reimpresiones.
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| 504 |
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|a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 473-483) e índice.
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|a 1. Introduction. -- 2. Overview of parte I. -- 3. The employment motive for monetary expansión. -- 4. The revenue motive for monetary expansión. -- 5. The mercantilistic or balance of payments motive for monetary expansión. -- 6. Comparison of policy outcomes under s system of adjustable pegs with outcomes under a commonly managed currency system and its consequences for european monetary unification. -- 7. The financial stability motive, interest rate smoothing, and the theory of optimal seigniorage. -- 8. Overview of models of monetary policy with private information. -- 9. The employment motive in the presence of a minimal information advantage about objetives. -- 10. Na extended information advantage about central bank objectives. -- 11. Alternative notions of credibility and reputation. -- 12. The politically optimal level of ambiguity. -- 13. Private information about Money demand and credibility. -- 14. Partial disclosure of policy and its effect on policy outcomes. -- 15. Why does inflation persist? Theories of monetary accommodation and of inflation cyclicality under discretion. -- 16. Signaling and prívate information about the ability to commit and abou objectives with time invariant types. -- 17. Political parties and monetary policy. -- 18. Aspects of central bank independence and their impacto n policy outcomes and the distribution of inflation. -- 19. The measurement of central bank independence. -- 20. Inflation and central bank independence. -- 21. Ranking of central bank by na overall índex of inflation based cental bank independence. -- 22. The mean and the variance of inflation, central bank credit, and central bank indpendence. -- 23. The determinants of central bank independence.
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|d 3971
|e 31/08/2015
|f 6065 EYN
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|a Banco.
|2 unesco
|9 10222
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|a Banco Central.
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|c LIBRO
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|o 332.11 C966 1992
|p D6065
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|z 1a ed., 2a reimpr., 1994.
|i 6065 EYN
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