Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline

This paper evaluates the trade-off between the advantages of risk sharing and the perils of common pool problems in federal fiscal arrangements. Under the assumption of asymmetric information we evaluate two alternative regimes of intergovernmental transfers. In one regime, the central government pr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado: 2004
Materias:
Common pool
Fiscal federalism
Insurance
Intergovernmental transfers
Risk sharing
insurance system
intergovernmental relations
risk factor
theoretical study
North America
United States
Acceso en línea:https://bibliotecadigital.exactas.uba.ar/collection/paper/document/paper_00221996_v62_n1_p149_Sanguinetti
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12110/paper_00221996_v62_n1_p149_Sanguinetti
Aporte de:
Biblioteca Digital - Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales (UBA) de Universidad de Buenos Aires

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