There is (some) truth in that
In this paper I present a formal treatment for the notion “there is (some) truth in that”. I adopt a first order language and assume a bivalued interpretation. I claim that “there is (some) truth in x” behaves as a partial and not transparent truth attribution. I argue that it should be modeled usin...
Guardado en:
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/6502 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=6502_oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In this paper I present a formal treatment for the notion “there is (some) truth in that”. I adopt a first order language and assume a bivalued interpretation. I claim that “there is (some) truth in x” behaves as a partial and not transparent truth attribution. I argue that it should be modeled using a predicate rather than an operator. I introduce a predicate and consider three alternative criteria to characterize its semantics. I prove that, with any of the criteria, the predicate trivializes any classical theory that adopts a strong self-referential procedure. |
|---|