Judicialization of politics and interest groups in Brazil: interest, strategies and results
After 24 years of constitutional rule in Brazil, what can be learned about the interaction between pressure groups and the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (fsc)? Which are the political actors who achieve the best results? What issues are judged more by the fsc? Does the fsc favor a specific topic o...
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| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Salamanca
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/alh2016725988 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=es/es-011&d=article9426oai |
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| Sumario: | After 24 years of constitutional rule in Brazil, what can be learned about the interaction between pressure groups and the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (fsc)? Which are the political actors who achieve the best results? What issues are judged more by the fsc? Does the fsc favor a specific topic or decisions are made regarding the plaintiff over the subject matter? If it were the case, who and what are the privileged ones by its decisions? This article analyzes the interaction between civil society and the Judiciary, based on observation of the use of Direct Unconstitutional Action (duas). The paper also assesses the industrial lawsuits, filed in stf jurisdiction by the National Industry Union (cni) and argues that: (1) the powerful groups received most success when proposing duas; (2) while there was a low probability of success, the groups gained benefits from bringing the conflict of interest to Supreme Court; and (3) the judicialization of pressure groups’ interests is a complementary and coordinated strategy with groups advocacy in the legislative arena. |
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