Kelsen and Legal Pluralism?
In the present essay, the author revisits some of the fundamental categories of Theory of Law,in particular that of Hans Kelsen. The object of this is not to reinforce the most orthodox postulates oftraditional legal theory, which derive themselves from a particular reading of Kelsen’s Theory. Contr...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rcj/article/view/35749 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-005&d=article35749oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In the present essay, the author revisits some of the fundamental categories of Theory of Law,in particular that of Hans Kelsen. The object of this is not to reinforce the most orthodox postulates oftraditional legal theory, which derive themselves from a particular reading of Kelsen’s Theory. Contraryto this, the goal is to retake these concepts in a critical manner, especially to use them in order to explain,without the Eurocentric prejudices, the phenomena of legal pluralism. A phenomenon which traditionallegal theory does not allow to recognize or explain. In this way, through the critical use of these concepts,the essay proposes to construct a possible interdisciplinary analysis, which uses both legal anthropologyand legal theory |
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