Skepticism About Legal Duties Between Expressivism and Error Theorythe
This paper reconstructs the two main versions of skepticism about legal duties —expressivism and error theory— based on the theses developed by the Uppsala school, particularly Axel Hägerström. After clarifying these two positions, the article addresses two central objections to skepticism. The firs...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/281 |
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| Sumario: | This paper reconstructs the two main versions of skepticism about legal duties —expressivism and error theory— based on the theses developed by the Uppsala school, particularly Axel Hägerström. After clarifying these two positions, the article addresses two central objections to skepticism. The first, raised by Hart, argues that skepticism fails to account for the linguistic intentions of judges when they utter statements of duties. The second, raised by Dworkin, challenges the distinction between first-order (committed) and second-order (theoretical) discourse on which skepticism relies. The paper responds to both critiques and argues that, despite such challenges, skeptical positions remain philosophically viable within legal discourse. |
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