Risk, ambiguity, and decision /

"Ellsberg presents a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the postion originally presented in his much-discussed article, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms." In this cogently argued book, he mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational deci...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Ellsberg, Daniel
Formato: Libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: New York : Garland, 2001.
Colección:Studies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.)
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Aporte de:Registro referencial: Solicitar el recurso aquí
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100 1 |a Ellsberg, Daniel. 
245 1 0 |a Risk, ambiguity, and decision /  |c Daniel Ellsberg. 
260 |a New York :  |b Garland,  |c 2001. 
300 |a liii, 281 p. :  |b il. ;  |c 24 cm. 
490 1 |a Studies in philosophy 
500 |a Basado en su tesis (doctoral)--Harvard University, 1962. 
504 |a "Further readings on choice under uncertainty, beliefs and the Ellsberg paradox / compiled by Mark J. Machina": p. xxxix-xlviii. 
504 |a Incluye referencias bibliográficas (p. 271-281). 
505 0 |a 1. Ambiguity and risk. Vagueness, confidence, and the weight of arguments. The nature and uses of normative theory. The validation of normative propositions. The utility axioms as norms. Normative theory and empirical research -- 2. The Bernoulli proposition. A possible counterexample : are there uncertainties that are not risks? Vulgar evaluations of risk -- 3. The measurement of definite opinions. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. Probability as price. "Coherence" and "definiteness" of probability-prices. Appendix to chapter three -- 4. Opinions and actions : which come first? The logic of degrees of belief. Opinions that make horse races. Postulate 2 : the "sure-thing principle". Intuitive probabilities and "vagueness". Appendix to chapter four -- 5. Uncertainties that are not risks. The "three-color urn" example. Vulgar evaluations of ambiguity. Appendix to chapter five -- 6. Why are some uncertainties not risks? Decision criteria for "complete ignorance". Decision criteria for "partial ignorance" -- 7. The "restricted Hurwicz criterion". The "restricted Bayes/Hurwicz criterion". Boldness and prudence : the "n-Color urn" example. Ignorance, probability, and varieties of gamblers -- 8. Ambiguity and the utility axioms. The Pratt/Raiffa criticisms and the value of randomization. Rubin's axiom. Allais and the sure-thing principle. Winning at Russian roulette. 
520 |a "Ellsberg presents a sophisticated and detailed elaboration of the postion originally presented in his much-discussed article, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms." In this cogently argued book, he mounts a powerful and influential challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision, and opens new lines of investigation whose lessons still have not been fully assimilated." --Descripción del editor. 
650 0 |a Decision making. 
650 0 |a Statistical decision. 
650 7 |a Toma de decisiones.  |2 UDESA 
650 7 |a Decisión estadística.  |2 UDESA 
830 0 |a Studies in philosophy (New York, N.Y.)